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CHAPTER I . I NTRODUCTION 
The Role of Government in Economic Growth 
The role of gover nment in economic growth often generates conflict-
ing points of view. One view is that growth in government size retards 
economic growth. This is invariably the position of the economists 
and others who favor the free market and consider government an ob-
stacle to economic growth. Another view is that growt h in government 
size is a catalys t to economic gr owth . This is of t en the position 
of those who consider government to be necessary in removing impedi-
men t s to economic gr owth . 
The ear liest and best known argument in favor of the free market 
1 
was by Adam Smith , the founder of classical political economy . Adam 
Smith employed the notion of self-interest (the invisible hand) to 
s how that each individual in society , if left alone, will seek to 
maximize his own wealth; therefore, all individuals, if unimpeded, 
will maximize aggregate wealth . In other words, according to Adam 
Smith, social interest is simply the sum of the self- interests of 
the individuals in society . For instance, in the first volume of the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith succinctly stated the argument for the free 
market as follows : 
. . . The annual revenue of every society is 
always precisely equal to the exchange value 
of the whole annual produce of its indus-
try . ... As every individual, therefore , 
endeavors as much as he can both to employ 
his capital in the support of domes t ic 
2 
industry, and s o to direct that industry that 
its produce may be of the greatest value; 
every individual necessarily l a bors to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great 
as he can . .. . By preferring the support of 
domestic to foreign industry, he intends only 
his own security; and directing that industry 
in such a manner as its produce may be of 
the gr eatest value, he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many o ther 
cases, led b y an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention ... . 
By pursuing his own inte rest, he frequently 
promotes that of the society more frequently 
than he really intends to promote it.2 
Thus , according to Adam Smith , the interest of society is simply 
the sum of the self - interes t s of the member s of society . Does gove r n -
ment then have any role to play in the interest of society? 
Adam Smith prescribed three functions fo r government as follows : 
(1) national defense, (2 ) maintaining law and order, and (3) building 
and maintaining cer t ain public works and institutions which cannot be 
run profitably by the priva t e sector. Clearly , government has a very 
limited r ole in economic gr owth . 
The case for restricting the r ol e of governmen t in economic 
gr owth has , since the day of Adam Smith, been ar ticulated with greater 
precision. The principal ar guments agains t incr eased participation 
of government in economic affairs are that: (1) government operations 
ar e often conducted ineffici ently because they a re not usually subjec t 
to economic crite ria, (2) many government fiscal and moneta r y policies 
tend t o lower the productivity of the economy, and (3) government 
spending crowds out private investment a nd cons umption . 3 Fr om an 
3 
accounting perspective: Y = C + I + G + oK ; where Y denotes real 
GNP ; C denotes private consumption; I, net investment; G, government 
spending; K, real capital s tock ; and o denotes the r ate of deprecia-
tion of capital . According to the free market argument, holding o 
and K constant, an increase in G comes only at the expense of I and 
C, and the effect is to diminish the growth of Y. 
However, there is t he opposite view that growth in the government 
size is a catalyst to economic growth. The earliest and best known 
argument for a gr eater r ole of government in the economy was by Karl 
4 Marx . Accor ding to Karl Marx, out of a period of capitalism there 
emer ges a sys t em of socialism in which there is government ownership 
of the means of pr oduction . Marx , however , saw socialism also as a 
transitory system which is succeeded by communism . Communism , in his 
sense , is a classless society in that there is only one class -- the 
proletariat. Ther efore, the transition from socialism to conununism 
is characterized by a withering of the state : the state atrophies 
because there is no r ole for governmen t in a classless society . 
As in the case of the free market argument , the case for the 
economic function of government has, since the day of Karl Marx, been 
articulated with greater precision . The principal arguments in this 
case are that : (1) government is crucial in harmonizing conflicts 
between private and social inte rests, (2) government can protect the 
domestic economy f r om the vagaries o( the world market , and (3) 
government can secure an increase in productive investment a nd provide 
4 
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a socially optimal level of economic growth . According to the famous 
researcher on the characteristics of modern economic growth , Simon 
Kuznets, one of the characteristics of modern economic growth is having 
to resolve conflicts continuously generated by rapid changes in eco-
. d . 1 6 nomic a n socia structure. Kuznets asserts that, for economic growth 
to occur , it is necessary that such conflicts a re resolved with least 
costs; and government in this case plays a crucial role in the peace-
ful resolution of such growth-induced conflicts . 
In addition, government can also stimulate gr owth by investing 
in human capital formation: by investing in health and education . 
Productivity of private investment c learly depends on the health and 
skills of the labor force . Therefore , a higher level of government 
spending may not reduce capital fo rmation if a s ubstantial portion 
of government spending is investment. The point simply is that, con-
cerning the issue of government size a nd economic growth, there is 
an opposite view to the f ree market argument : there is t he v i ew that 
growth in government size is a ca t alys t to economic growth. 
Definition of the Problem 
The case of Zambia very well illustrates the cons trasting views 
on the relationship betwee n government size and economic gr owth . In 
Zambia, the public sector has grown considerably as a result of the 
Government ' s attempt to industrialize the economy through the public 
sector . Start ing in April 1968 with what are n ow known as the 
Mulungushi Reforms , the Government has c r eated a complex system of 
5 
state enterprises or parastatals . The Mulungushi Reforms placed major 
sectors of the economy under state control, and a state enterprise, 
the Industrial Development Corporation (Indeco), was created in order 
to implement Zambia's industrial policy. In April 1970, Indeco became 
a one hundred percent government-owned subsidiary of the Zambia 
Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) -- the organization which 
holds the Government's interests in mining and industry . 
However, since a sharp and prolonged economic recession began 
in 1973, this system of state enterprises has been reconsidered. As 
is now increasingly recognized, the recession in Zambia and other 
African countries is" . . . the most severe, prolonged and debilitating 
socio- economic crisis to hit any world region in recent history. 117 
In Zambia, the crisis has, among other things , called into question 
the Government ' s strategy of industrialization through the public 
sector. The principal focus of attention has been on the inefficiency 
of the parastatals as well as the issue of government subsidies to 
the parastatals. 
The Government itself now recognizes that parastatals, for the 
most part, operate inefficiently . One reason for this is that the 
parastatals have t o f ulfill noneconomic objectives besides that of 
industrialization . Besides the objective of industrialization , para-
statals in Zambia are also designed to benefi t consumers and farmers 
through government subsidies and price controls. However, the pre-
vailing crisis and the necessary recovery program have suggested 
6 
structural reforms in two areas : (1) rationalizing the scope of the 
public sector and (2) improving the structure of incentives faced by 
. 8 
the private sector. 
In principle at least, the Government has come to accept the 
need for structural reforms and has since 1986 attempted to restructure 
the copper industry and the c ivil service . The Government has also 
attempted to reduce the budget deficit in order to slow down the rate 
of growth of money supply. Reducing the deficit has, in turn, called 
for reduction in subsidies to parastatals and phasing out price con-
trols so that the Government can be freed from the budgetary burden 
of the deficit . The Governmen t has, in fac t, succeeded in r educing 
the deficit from 30% of the Gross Domestic Product in 1986 to 14% in 
1987; and has reduced the number of commodities subjec t to price con-
trols from 21 in 1987 to 11 in 1988. 9 
In practice , however, the removal of subsidies has raised the 
issue of how to protect the poor. As is often the case , subsidies 
on goods and services consumed by the poor a r e justified . However, to 
contain costs, the subsidies should be accu r ately targeted; and this 
cannot easily be done in practice. Thus, while the Zambian Government 
is committed to phasing out subsidies eventually , there is s till the 
problem of finding more efficient ways of transferring income to the 
poorest segments of the Zambian population . 
In addition, budgetary constraint s have also adversely affected 
education and health services. For instance, according t o the United 
7 
Nations Department of Public Information: " an alarming increasing 
in nutrition- r elated child mortality, the most tragic repercussion 
of the prolonged crisis he re, is raising new questions about long term 
1 1 b . d. b . . . ,,10 p ans to remove cost y government su si ies on asic necessities. 
The basic problem i s how to remove the budgetary burden of subsidies 
without intensifying the nutrition crisis and therefore retarding 
long-term economic growth. This problem best illustrates the dilemma 
that Zambia and other developing countries face: the dilemma of main-
taining short-t erm economic stability without having to retard long-
term economic growth . 
The purpose of the present study is therefore to examine the 
relationship between government size and economic growth in Zambia . 
The study is predicated on two principal factors . Firsc:, the study is 
based on the predominant role of the public sector in the Zambian 
economy and therefore the expec t ation that growth in government size 
has a negative impact on economic growth in Zambia. Second , the study 
is based on the dilennna that the Zambia Government faces: the dilemma 
of maintaining short-term economic stability without having to retard 
long-term economic growth . 
The study employs a two-sector growth model to test the hypothesis 
that economic growt h varies inversely with government size in Zambia . 
In the model , the Zambian economy is characterized as consisting of two 
sectors: a government sector and a nongovernment sector . The output, 
that is, the size of the goverrunent sector exercises an externality 
8 
effect on the output of the nongovernment sector , and the term "ex-
ternality" is defined in the us ual economic sense as t he case where 
the actions of one economic agent affec t the utili t y or product i on 
o f another agent. The model is then applied t o time series Zambian 
data fo r the period 1964-84 . 
In addition, the present study examines two related issues : 
(1) saving as a func tion of national income, and (2) i nvestment as a 
funct ion of national income in Zambia . Clearly , a n understanding of 
these issues i s invaluable in Zambia because of the vagaries of ex-
ternal borrowing and the problems of debt - servicing. 
The Plan of the Stud y 
This study consists of six chap ters including the Introduction. 
Chapter II sets the theoretical framework of the study . Chapter III 
deals with the sources of economic growth . Accounting fo r the sources 
of economic growth helps to understand why economic gr owth r a t es vary 
f rom time t o time and f r om place t o place . 
Chapter I V deals with the particular case of government as a source 
of economic gr owth. Attention i s focused on both the theor y and evi-
dence of government as a source of economic growth . The basic conclu-
sion i n this case is that the effe ct of government size on economic 
gr owth is, in gener al , both a theoretical and empirical i ssue . 
Chapter V outlines the t wo-sector gr ow t h model that i s used to 
test the hypothesi s t ha t economi c gr owt h varies inversely wi th govern-
9 
ment size in Zambia. Chapter VI summarizes and draws conclusions from 
the present study. 
It should be noted that in this thesis, endnotes are numbered 
consecutively throughout each chapter, starting with number one for 
each new chapter. Tables are numbered in the same way . This sys t em 
follows the instructions for preparing theses and dissertations by the 
Graduate School and the Department of Economics at Iowa State Univer-
sity. 
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CHAPTER II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There is no consensus on the measurement of "government." One 
reason for this is tha t countries sometimes fol low different systems 
of national accounting. Another reason is that, in some countries, 
the meaning of " government" i s not easy t o delineate since the govern-
ment owns all the means of production, and in a sense everyone works 
for the government. 
Similar ly, there is no consensus on the measurement of " economic 
growth." Two main indices of economic gr owt h are outlined here, in 
this chapter. The principal s hor t coming of these indices concerns the 
issue of social welfare. Often , the indices do not take int o account 
such fac tors as income distribution and the quality of life . 
Def inition and Measurement of "Government" 
The term of "government" may be defined in various ways . In the 
present study, however, government is defined as" .. . the administra-
tion of the function s of state within an organized societ y , or persons 
who actually administer these functions . 111 In o t her words , govern-
ment is here meant to denote the es tablished system of political rule 
and administra tion such as a democra tic, a monarchic, or an aristo-
cr atic; a dual, presidential or par liamentary sys t em of government. 
Clearly, there are many sys tems of government and this makes it 
difficult to comp ar e government size across co untries . Besides, 
countr ies sometimes follow different sys t ems of national account ing . 
12 
Market-oriented countr ies , for instance, follow the gr oss na tional 
pr oduct (GNP) , while some socialist countries follow the ne t material 
product (NMP) sys tem; the Marxian equivalent of the GNP sys t em. The 
use of the GNP and NMP systems presents sever al conceptual pr oblems 
2 
i n the meas urement of gove rnment size . One problem, f or instance, 
is that the GNP system distinguishes between private and public sec-
t or s while the NMP does not. Rather , the NMP system , fo llowing Karl 
Marx, distinguishes between pr oduc tive and nonpr oductive activity . 
Another conceptual problem is tha t, i n socialist coun tries , the mean-
ing of government or public sector is not easy to delinea t e since the 
government owns nearly all t he means of production and in a sense near-
ly ever yo ne works fo r the gove rnment. 
Zambia, however, fol l ows the GNP sys tem. The government sec t or 
in Zambia is defined by the United Nations Sys t em of Na tional Accounts 
the UN SNA sys t em. Under this system, government size can be measured 
as follows : first a distinction is made between the total product of 
3 the country and t he GNP . The total soc i al product is the broader 
concept and more difficult to estimate because it includes the unpaid 
work of housewives o r the unpaid work of school childr en . The GNP is 
the narrowe r concept a nd i s measured by the amoun t s of goods and 
services which appear on the mar ket; plus a n estimate of non.market 
goods a nd servi ces , fo r instance, of peasant produc t ion. Second , a 
distinction is made between the GNP and the public sec t or . The public 
sector is a s ubse t of the GNP and involves a nything within the GNP 
13 
not on the market. In other words, the public sector is the opposite 
of the private sector, in which events are determined by market proc-
esses of supply and demand . Third, a distinction is made between the 
public sector and the government sector . The government sector is a 
subset of the public sector; it represents a part of the public sector 
devoted t o political and administrative purposes . Thus, according to 
the UN System of National Accounts, the government sector includes: 
all bodies, departments and establislunents 
of government -- central, state or provincial, 
district or county , municipal , town or village 
-- which engage in a wide range of activities, 
for example, adminis tration, defense, a nd regu-
lation of the public order; health, educational, 
cultural , r ecr eational and other social ser -
vices; and promotion of economic growth and 
welfare and technological development . 4 
Once the government sector is delineated, a distinction is then 
made between four sizes of government . First , government size may be 
measured by the central goverrunent ; tha t is , it may be measured by 
central government revenues a nd expenditures . Second, government size 
may be measured by the general government ; that is, it may be measured 
by the total of central government, pr ovincial or state government 
revenues and expenditures. This is because government often exists 
at different geographical l evel s : the central , departmental, and mu-
nicipal, rural or village leve l. Third, government size may be 
measured by general government plus public institutions such as the 
post office and the social security adminis tration . Fourth, govern-
ment size may be measur ed by gene r al government plus public institu-
14 
tions plus nationalized industries s uch as mining in some countries, 
but usually the railroad, the telegraph and telphone companies. This 
is clearly the widest concept of government size. 
Definition and Measurement of 
"Economic Growth" 
The term "economic growth" may be defined in various ways. In 
the present s t udy, however, economic growth is defined as a rise in 
total or per capita GNP . 
5 
And economic growth is to be distinguished 
from economic development. As Robert A. Flammang has stated: II 
economic growth is a process of simple increase, implying more of the 
same, while economic development is a process of structural change , 
6 
implying something different if not something more . " In other 
words, development involves structural change while gr owth does not; 
and development is therefore of ten defined as gr owth plus s tructural 
change . For instance , Gerald M. Meier distinguishes between the two 
concepts as follows : 
Economic development involves something more 
than economic gr owth . Development is taken 
to mean growth plus change; there are essential 
qualitative dimensions in the development 
process that may be absent in the growth or 
expansion of an economy through a simpl e widen-
ing process. This qualitative difference is, 
especi ally likely to appear in the improved 
performance of the factors of production and 
improved techniques of production -- in 
growing control over nature . It is also 
likely to appear in the development of insti-
tutions and a change in attitudes.7 
15 
The point is simply t hat, economic growth is usually s t a t ed in 
terms of i n creases in income while economi c devel opment is considered 
to be an economic, a social, as well as a political process . 
Economic gr owth is of ten measured in t wo principal ways . One 
way in which economic growth is measured is by the growth in total 
income or output, that is, the gr owth in GNP . Another way in which it 
is measured is by the growth in per capita income or output, that is , 
the gr owth in per capita GNP. The main d i fference between the two 
indices is that per capita GNP = GNP/popula tion. Thus, per capita 
GNP is corrected for population change and as s uch, per capita GNP 
is somet imes considered to be a be tter index of changes in the level 
of welfare of individuals in socie t y .
8 
However, both indices of economic growth are not adequate measures 
of soci al welfare because they do no t indicate how national income 
i s dis tr ibuted and who is benefiting most from the growt h in production . 
For this reason, several other measures are sometimes employed to 
characterize growth in social welfare . 
9 
These include: (1) growth 
in per capita con sumption, and (2) the fulfillment of basic human 
needs . And the basic human needs are considered t o be nutrition, edu-
cation , health , sanitation , water supply , and housing .
1Q Correspond-
ing to these basic needs a r e various indices of the extent to which 
the basic needs are fulfil l ed . For instance, life expectancy at 
bir th is the index assoc i ated with health, literacy is the index as-
sociat ed with educat ion, infant mortality is associated with water 
16 
supply and sanitation, etc . In turn, the indices life expectancy, 
basic literacy, and infant mortality a r e sometimes combined into a 
simple index known as the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI); 
which is a composite measure of the degree to which basic needs are 
met. 
The point again is that the two common indices of economic growth 
are by themselves not adequate measures of growth in social welfare . 
They ought to be supplemented by other indices such as growth in per 
capita consumption, and the degree to which basic human needs are 
being fulfilled. 
17 
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CHAPTER III. 
SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The search for sources of economic growth has a long and illus-
trious his tory. During the 16th century, the bullionists, in Europe, 
held that accumulation of gold was the source of weal th of a nation .
1 
Towards the end of the 16th century , mercantilists considered a fa -
vorable balance of trade to be the source of wealth of a nation . The 
best known argument in favor of mercantilism was by Thomas Mun and 
the mercantilists ' notion of what determines economic growth was sue-
cinctly summed up by the title of his book, England ' s Treasure by 
Forraign Trade: or the Ballance of our Forraign Trade is the Rule of 
our Treasure. During the 17th century , the Physiocrats in France 
considered agriculture to be the source of wealth of a nation . Ac-
cording to the Physiocrats, onl y agriculture is capable of yielding 
a surplus in excess of production costs . Whereas trade and manu-
facturing are productive, their ou tput is fully offse t by factor costs , 
leaving these nonagricultural sectors barren or "sterile . " 
Thus, while the bullionis ts conside red gold and the mercantilists 
considered trade to be the source, the Physiocrats considered agri-
culture to be the source of growth. In this chapter, two sets of 
gr owth theories are examined: the classical and the neoclassical 
growth theories. As indicated in Chapter I, accounting for sources 
of economic growth helps to understand why economic gr owth rates vary 
from time to time and f rom place to place . 
19 
Classical Growth Theories 
The search for sources of economic growth gained prominence 
during the 18th century following the publication , in 1776, of Adam 
Smith ' s treatise: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Weal th of Nations. According to Adam Smith, growth in the wealth 
of a nation is determined by two factors: 
... first, by the skill, dexterity, and judge-
ment with which [the nation's] labour is gen-
erally applied; and secondly , by the proportion 
between the number of those who are employed 
in useful labour, and that of those who are 
not employed . Whatever be the soil, climate, 
or extent of territory of any particular nation, 
the abundance or scantiness of its annual sup-
pl y must, in that particular situation depend 
upon those two circtunstances.2 
Thus, Adam Smith characterized the sources of growth as: (1) 'the 
skills , dexterity and judgement' of the labor f orce, and (2) the pro-
portion of labor employed in productive activity . Smith s t ated that 
3 these factors , in turn, depend on the division of labor . And the 
division of labor is in turn determined by two factors . First, the 
division of labor is determined by the extent of the market ; that is, 
nothing limits the degree to which specialization can be carried except 
the marketable volume of output . Second, the division of labor is 
determined by the amount of capital that the labor f orce has t o work 
wi th. Based on this, the second observation, Smith then arrived at 
the notion that capitalists are the ones r esponsible for economic 
growth . 
20 
Indeed, Smith is said t o have conveyed two principal messages 
4 
in The Wealth of Nations; messages that struck just the right chord. 
One is the idea of a self-regulating market; the idea that people, 
if left alone, will spontaneously or ganize themselves int o a market. 
The absolute best that the governmen t can do is to duplicate that . 
At best , the government is useless; at worst, it decreases the wealth 
of a nation. The other message is of saving being necessary for 
progress : the idea that saving leads to investment, which leads to 
gr owth in the weal th of a nation. In other words , the rate of growth 
of outpu t is a fun ction of profi t on capital . And in stating this, 
Smith appealed to what was to become the dominant class of the future: 
the industrial capitalists. In fact, Adam Smith , along with Karl 
Marx and John Maynard Keynes , is considered to be one of the three 
economi s t s who have had the most influence on policy . 
However, despite the leading influence of Smith, Marx, and Keynes, 
it is David Ricardo ' s growth theory which is considered to have much 
r elevance to the case of developing countr ies . 5 The main emphasis 
of the Ricardian growth model is on the agricultural sector and land 
as the determinants of growth. 
According to David Ricardo , growth in population leads to an in-
crease in food demand, which, in turn , leads to cultivation on poorer 
and poorer land; t o diminishing returns to labor and capital , and t o 
a fall in agricultural output per worker . Ricardo considered wages 
to be determined by a standard-of-living and therefore fixed . As 
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agricultural productivity falls, since wages are fixed, labor ab-
sorbs a larger and larger fraction of output, while capital absorbs 
a smaller and smaller fraction; and the residual is rent . Furthermore, 
Ricardo observed that if profits fall in agriculture, they fall 
throughout the economy. The fall in profits leads to a fall in the 
incentives to save and to invest; and therefore to a fall in capital 
accumulation . In the long run, the economy reaches a stationary state : 
a point when growth ceased. 
Ricardo ' s growth model i s depic ted in Figure 1 and this in terms 
of the two indices of economic growth discussed earlier in Chapter II; 
namely : (1) economic growth defined as growth in national income, 
and (2) economic growth defined as growth in per capita national income . 
In panel (a), growth is measured in terms of national income. As the 
economy grows, overtime the scarcity of land imposes limits t o growth . 
The result is an increase in rent because it i s a return to a fixed 
factor . Meanwhile, profits fal l to zero and wages grow , depending 
on the growth in population. In panel (b), growth i s measured in terms 
of per capita income. As the economy grows , overtime the scarcity 
of land again imposes limits to growth. The result is again an in-
crease in rent and fall in profits. However, on a per capita basis , 
wages r emain constant a t the s ubsis t ence level. 
The notion of a stationary s t ate -- the s t age when growth ceased 
was fundamental to the classical political economy . However, t her e 
were two contrasting points of view, a nd these a re s till prevalent 
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Figur e 1 . The Ricardian growth model 
today . On the one hand, there was the view held by Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, and Jean-Baptise Say. This was the v iew that economic growth 
eventually ceased beca use of insufficient supply . In other words, sup -
ply was the constraint to economic gr owth, as dep i cted , for i nstance, by 
the Ricardian model above. On the othe r hand, there was the v iew held 
by Robert Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx (and later by John Maynard 
Keynes). This was the view that growth ceased because of insufficient 
demand. For instance , in his theory of under-consumption, Mal t hus 
crit icized Say ' s law of marke t s : the law that s upply creat es i ts own 
6 
demand . Malthus argued that produc t ion depends upon effective demand, 
otherwise there will be under-consumption a nd growth will be constr ained . 
This effective demand is one whic h establishes a price high enough 
to allow a producer to pay all cos t s of production and s t il l make a 
profit. 
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In retrospect, however, it is now generally agreed that the 
classical economists considerably underestimated the potential of 
modern technology to r aise productivity . In fact , the major source 
of modern economic growth has been attributed to mass a pplication 
of t echnolog i cal innovations . For instance, in his well- known studies 
on modern economic gr owth, Simon Kuznets has observed that the rates 
of modern economi c gr owth are unprecedented in histor y , and the major 
sour ce of wha t he calls the 'revolutionar y acceleration ' has been the 
1 . . f h 1 . 1 . . 
7 
app 1cat1on o tee no ogica innovations . Technological innovations 
have, in turn, been t he result of modern science . Thus, according 
to another r esearcher on modern economic gr owth , Richar d A. Es t ernlin : 
The scientific revolution helps accoun t not 
onl y for the appear ance of modern economic 
growth but also for the broad geogr aphical 
pa ttern of its spr ead . Modern economic devel -
opment makes its appearance in the Western 
world wher e t he scientific revolution is oc -
curr ing and spreads most r apidly to those 
a r eas where education development has made the 
transfer of new knowl edge most feasible . 8 
Furthermor e , Kuznets and Ester nlin have observed that modern 
science has, in turn, benefited from the mass application of techno-
logical innovations because the latter has provided a l a r ger economic 
s urplus for basic applied r esearch , and has also permitteo the de-
velopment of new efficient too l s for scientific use . In othe r words, 
modern science and technology " . .. are in t errelated, in that one 
9 causes another in a cause and effec t sequence ." 
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Neoclassical Growth Theories 
Classical economists like Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Robert 
Thomas Malthus saw the economic problem as a contrast between fixed 
land and variable labor, while cap ital is nothing but stored - up labor. 
However, neoclassical economists like William Stanley Jevons, Carl 
Menger, Leon Walras, Alfred Marshall, and Aurthur Cecil Pigou saw 
the economic problem as that of optimal allocation of scarce resources 
among alternative uses. At least until the 20th century, neoclassical 
economists did not, for the most part, address the issue of economic 
growth. The main reason for this seems t o be the fac t that in Western 
Europe and North America, growth proceeded r apidly and did not there-
fore attract as much attention as the problem of optimal allocation 
10 
of resources . On the o ther hand, the Gr ea t Depression of the 1930s 
and the growing awareness of poverty outside Europe and North America 
seem to be the bases for the r e turn to growth analysis during the 
20th century . 
One product of the return to growth analysis in this century i s 
the Harrod - Domar model; named after the economists Roy F. Harrod and 
11 
Evsey D. Domar. The essential featu r es of this model are depicted 
by the Harrod-Domar gr owth equation which may be obtained as follows. 
Let: 
Y na tional income 
K capital stock 
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I = investment 
S savings 
g growth rate of the economy 
s =savings ratio, i . e. , S/Y 
k capital/output ratio, i.e., 
S I by assumption 
It= 6Kt+l by assumption 
6K 
1
/6Y 
t+ 
Also , assuming fixed coefficients of factor inputs, then: 
g = y (3.1) 
Dividing the nume~ator and the denominator of the right - hand side of 
equation (1) by I, and rearranging yields: 
g 
I/Y 
I/6Y 
Since S I by assumption , then, 
s 
s = y 
Similarly , since I 
t 
k 
I 
y 
6Kt+l by assumption , then : 
I 
y 
(3. 2) 
(3 . 3) 
(3 . 4 ) 
Substituting equations (3.3) and (3.4) int o equation (3 . 2) y ields: 
g 
s 
k 
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(3. 5) 
Equation (3.5) is the Harrod- Damar gr owth equation and it says 
tha t the growth rate of the economy, g , can be increased in two ways. 
One way is to lower the cap ital/output ratio, k . This is equivalent 
to increasing the effec tiveness with which capital stock is used to 
produce output . The o ther way is to raise the proportion of national 
income that is saved, s . The assumption in this case is that what-
ever is saved is invested, that S = I. Therefore, raising the savings 
ratio increases investment, and this in turn creates additional pro-
ductive capacity and leads to more income in the following period . 
Higher income in turn leads to savings, investment, capital formation 
and gr eater income in the next period . 
Thus, the Harrod- Damar model, in essence, underlines how one 
period ' s capital fo rmat ion is the next period ' s source of highe r sav-
ings , capital formation and greater output in the next period, e t c . 
And this is considered to be the main contribution of the Harrod-
D d 1 h 1 
. 12 omar mo e t o gr owt ana ysis . 
In the Harrod-Damar model, physical capital accumulation is the 
ultimate source of economic growth. However, the model , just like 
the classical models, has been criticized for neglecting the effects 
13 of technological change . 
Another pr oduct of the return to growth analysis during the 20 th 
14 centur y is the Solow growth model, by Robert M. Solow . The Solow 
27 
growth model is generally considered to be the basis for neoclassical 
growth economics. The model makes a significant departure from the 
classical and the Harrod-Domar models in that it accounts for techno-
logical change . 
In his model, Robert M. Solow began assuming an aggr egate produc-
t ion function of the form: 
Q F(K, L , t) (3.6) 
where Q is the aggregate outpu t of the economy, Kand L are capital 
and labor inputs and t is time. The variable t appears in the produc-
tion function to allow for technica l change . 
In addition, Solow assumed that technical c hange is neutral; that 
is, it increases output from given inputs without affecting the marginal 
products of the inputs. On the basis of this assumption , the pro -
duction function is written as the special case : 
Q(t) A(t)F(K(t), L(t)) (3 . 7) 
where A(t) measures the effects of technological change . Equation 
(3 . 7) is then totally differentiated with respect to time, to obtain : 
~ ( ( ( dA + a F () K a F a L 
dt F Kt), Lt)) dt A(t) ()Kat + A(t) ()Lat 
or 
Q 
()F () F • 
F(K(t), L(t))A + A(t) () K K + A(t) ()LL (3 . 8) 
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where dot indicates time derivatives. Dividing equation (3 . 8) through 
by Q and dropping the time parameter , t, for notational convenience, 
yields 
(3.9) 
Noting that A aF = aQ and A aF = aQ and substituting these in equation 
aK aK a1 aL' 
(3 . 9) yields : 
. . . 
A + ao ~ + aQ .!: 
A aK Q at Q 
ClQ K Defining wk = ~ - and w 
aK Q L 
ClQ L and therefore ~KQ = cu.. -
1
Q and 
ClL Q' o K. 
.N Q d b . . h ( ) ClL = ~ L ' an s u stituting t ese into equa t ion 3 .10 yields : 
o r , G 
v 
where, 
G = .9. v Q the gr owth rate of aggregate output 
GA 
A 
A the growth rate of total facto r productivity 
GK 
K 
K 
the gr owth rate of capital 
(3 . 10) 
(3 .11) 
(3 . 12) 
L 
L 
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= the growth rate of labor 
the elasticity of output with respect to 
capital 
the elasticity of output with respect t o 
labor 
Equation (3.12) is often called the neoclassical growth equation . 
The equation says that there are three sources of growth of aggregate 
output, G . These are: (1) the growth of total factor productivity, 
v 
GA; (2) the growth of capital, GK ; and (3) the gr owth of labor, GL . 
Clearly, the Solow gr owth model can be ext ended to t he case of 
many inputs, for instance : 
Q (F(K, L , R; t) (3.13) 
where K, L, and R are capital, labor and land, respec tive l y , and t 
stands fo r time . It should also be noted that the input coeffic ients 
SK and 13
1 
in equation (3 . 12), defined as the elasticities of output with 
respec t to capital and labor, indicate the effect on output gr owth of 
a 1% increase in the growth of the given factor. Under conditions of 
competitive equilibrium, it is assumed that each factor is pa i d ac -
cording to its marginal product . Thus , for instance , the r eal wage 
. w _ aQ 
is e qual to the marginal product of labor . p - ()L. But by definition 
from above, oQ = (;) 9. = D 9. 
oL L L µL L . By substitution, we obtain : 
Thus, under the assumption of compet itive equilibrium, the SL is the 
e las t icity of output wi th respect to labor; a nd is also equal to the 
share of labor in t o tal output. rK Similarly , SK = PQ , where r is the 
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Because return t o capital and SK is share of capital in total output. 
output elasticities can rarely be es tima ced directly , these pr oduct 
11 d . . (7) 15 shares are norma y use to estimate equation . 
Cl early , by accounting for t echnical change , the Solow gr owth 
model is a significant departure f r om the classical and t he Har rod -
Damar gr owth models. Howeve r, the model has been subject t o c r iticism 
bo th in the context of developed and developing countries . And a well -
known critic of the neoclassical growth analys i s in the contex t of 
developed countries i s the Keynesian economist , Nicholas Kaldor .
16 
According to Kaldor , neoclassical analysis focuses mor e on substitu -
tion and neglec ts the complementarity between factors of production . 
I f factor s of production ar e comp l ement ar y , Kaldor ar gued , the r e can 
be no s uch thing as f ull-employment equilibr ium because in the process 
of prod uc tion, the pr oductive possibil i ties of the economy increase . 
Pr oduc t ion augments but also uses up r esour ces . Further mor e , Kaldor 
observed that produc tion cannot be said to be supply constrained 
because if demand is effec t ive , there will be an augmen t ation of 
r esour ces ; t herefor e , the concept of full-employmen t is a misnomer . 
Nicholas Kaldo r is pe r haps best known for his attempts to explain 
the "styl ized" facts of industr ial i zed economies . In addicion , Kaldor 
is known for the propositions or "laws " he advanced to explain the 
differences in gr owth r ates among industr ialized countries. 17 Kaldor 
s ubsequently r educed these pr oposit i ons to three gener aliza t ions . 
These a r e that : (1) the faster the rate of gr owth of manufacturing 
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industry, the faster the growth of national income; (2) the faster 
the growth of manufacturing , t he fas t er the gr owth of labor productiv-
ity i n manufacturing ; and (3) the faster the growth of manufacturing, 
the faster the growth of productivity outside manufacturing . 
Thus, according to Kaldor, manufacturing is the "engine of gr owth." 
Furthermor e, in terms of gr owth analysis, it is no teworthy that Kaldor 
r aised the issue of disequilibrium gr owt h in the context of developed 
countries. The point is simply that Kaldor seriousl y questioned the 
underlying assumptions neoclassical gr owth analysis even in the context 
of developed countries . 
However, it is in the context of developing countries that the 
issue of disequilibrium growth is considered t o be more significant . 
And in this case , the issue has been popularized by the struc tural 
approach to economic growth . 18 Table 1 summarizes the differences 
be tween the neoclassical and the struc tural app r oaches t o economic 
gr owth in developing countr ies. 
The neoclass ical and structural appr oaches differ in their as-
sumptions , t he empirical implications of these assump tions , as well as 
in the sources of gr owth in developing countries . But t he most im -
portant distinction between the two app roaches rela t es t o their as -
s umption s . The neoclassical approach assumes Par e t o optimality over 
time; that prices are flexible enough t o maintain equilibrium over 
time . The s truc tural approac h, on the o ther hand, assumes segmented 
factor markets, lags in price adjustments and therefore disequilibrium 
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Table 1. Neoclassi cal and s tructura l appr oaches t o economic gr owth 
Neoc l assical a pproach 
Factor return s equal marg inal 
productivity in all uses 
No economies of scale 
Perfect foresight and continu-
ous equilibrium in all 
market s 
Assumptions 
Structur a l appr oach 
Income - related changes in 
internal demand 
Constrained external markets 
and lags in adjustment 
Tr ansformation of productive 
structure produc ing dis -
equilibria in fac t or markets 
Empirical implications 
Relat i vely high elasticities of 
s ubstitution in demand and 
trade 
Limited need fo r sec t or disag-
gr egation 
Low price elast i cities and 
lags in adjustment 
Segmented factor ma r kets 
Lags in a dop ting new tech-
nology 
Sources of gr owth 
Capita l accumulation 
Increase in l abor quant ity 
and quality 
Increase in i ntermediate 
inputs 
To t al factor productivity growt h 
within sectors 
Neoclassical sources plus : 
Reall ocat i on of r esources 
to higher-productivity 
sectors 
Economies of scale and learn -
ing by doing 
Reduction of internal and 
external bottlenecks 
a 
Source: Hollis Chene r y et al . , Industrialization a nd Growth: 
A Comparative Stud y (London: Oxford University Press , 1986) , 15. 
in product and fac tor markets . According to the structural approach, 
one source of disequilibrium in developing countries is the duality 
of the labor market -- a duality between rural, subsis t ence labor and 
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urban, industrial labor.
19 
This duality is often reflected in the 
differences in returns to labor and capital between the rural agri-
cultural sector, and the urban i ndustrial sector. Another source of 
disequilibrium is the inefficient allocation of r esources in the ex-
port sector. This is often reflected in the tendency of import s to 
expand mor e rapidly t han exports, and in policies that favor import 
s ubstitution over export expansion. These factors, in turn, account 
for the recur rent balance of payments problems in many developing 
countries. 
Several economists have conducted s tudies designed to test the 
significance of structural variables in explaining growth rates in de-
1 d d d 1 . . 20 ve ope an eve oping countr ies . The researchers often test the 
neoclassical variabl es: capital stock, labor force growth, and im-
provements in the quality of labor. They also test the structural 
variables : capital and labor reallocation, export growth , capital 
inflow, and t he level of development. In addition, the researchers 
often employ variants of the neoclassical gr owth equation (3 . 12) above , 
with the general form: 
where, 
I 
y 
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= the r a t io of inves tment t o GNP (a pr oxy for the gr owth 
of capital s t ock) 
gr owth of the labor force 
a measure of i ncrease in labor quality 
a measure of the s hift of labor or capi t al out of 
agriculture 
= a measure of t he gr owth of exports 
a measure of the balance of payments 
21 
a measure of t he level of development 
Three gener al results emerge from these studies . First, there is 
a pattern of an accelerating and then declining rate of gr owth as per 
capita income r ises . In o t her words, economies grow and then "decay . " 
Second, the structural factor s a r e more significant for the deve l oping 
than developed countries , whereas the gr owt h of the labor fo r ce has 
more significant effect in developed than developing coun tr ies . Third , 
the growth of capital stock or investment is the only sour ce of growth 
that is sign ificant fo r both g r oups . 
Briefly , t hen , here i s an illus trative account of some of t hese 
studies . One of the best known efforts was by Edward F . Denison (1967) 
who , in his s tudy , examined t he sources of growt h in the United States 
and eight European countries dur ing 1950- 62 .
22 
Like Nicholas Kaldor, 
Denison' s primary interest was in explaining differences in growth 
rates among developed countries . On the other hand, Sherman Robins on 
(1969) examined the growth of 39 developing countries during 1958- 66, 
and compared his results with those of Denison . 23 Robinson obs erved 
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that in both cases, capital had the largest effect on gr owth ; as much 
as 52% in the case of developing countries. But he found significant 
differences in the effects of labor and structural factors . He found 
that labor had a rather low contribution to the growth rate in develop -
ing countries. On the average, labor accounted for 19% of the growth 
rate in developing countries. Denison, on the other hand, found 
that labor accounted for 33% of total gr owth fo r the United States and 
18% of total growth for the eight European countries. In other words, 
considered t ogether, Robinson and Denison found labor to be a significant 
source of growth in developed and not in developing countries . 
Similarly, Robinson compa r ed the estimates of the contribution 
of the structural variable: factor mobility between sec tors . In this 
case, his study, together with that of Denison, showed that factor 
mobility is a significant source of gr owth in developing a nd not in 
developed countries. This observation has also been supported by the 
empirical results of Everett E. Hagen and Oli Hawrylyshyn (1969); and 
Hollin B. Chenery, H. Elking t on, and C. Simons (1970) .
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Both studies 
included developed and developing countries in their sampl es, a nd both 
fo und structural variables to be significant sources of growth in 
developing and not in developed countries . 
Clearly, these studies suggest that there are somewhat different 
sets of gr owth factors for developed a nd developing countries . And 
this is one of the arguments sometimes advanced against monoeconomics 
but in favor of development e conomics as a separate field of study . 25 
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It is ar gued, deve lopment economics is needed because the assumptions 
of growth economics , based as they ar e on the existence of a fu lly de-
veloped and well - func tioning modern capitalist economy , do not apply 
in developing countries. The assumption, for instance , by the Harrod-
Domar model, that savings equal investment may not hold in deve l op ing 
countries . Higher savings may not lead to higher capi t al formation 
in developing countries because of the existence of idle capaci t y and 
pr oblems of allocating savings among alternative investment opportuni-
ties . 
However , the basic point to be made her e is that the r e are 
many sour ces of economic growth and these vary greatly in importance 
f r om time to t ime a nd from place to place . This conclusion is quite 
apparent when one surveys the his t ory of growth analysis before and 
after the classical economists . 
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CHAPTER IV. 
GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
There are many sources of economic growth and these sources vary 
greatly in importance from time to time and f rom place t o place. This 
was the theme of Chapter III. The purpose of Chapter IV i s to examine 
the particular case of government as a source of economic growth . The 
chapter has two sections. Section one deals with the theory while 
section two reviews the evidence of government as a sour ce of eco-
nomic growth. 
The Theory of Gove r nment as a 
Source of Growth 
Although there a r e many and various sources of growth , however, 
the sources can be divided into two broad categories .
1 
First , eco-
nomic gr owth may be due to changes in the resources used in production , 
that is, due to changes in factor inputs . There are three main sources 
of this kind; namely , land, labor and capital. Second, economic 
gr owth may be due t o changes that affect output per unit of input . 
There are again three main sources of this kind; namely , technology , 
efficiency, and government . Changes in these sour ces pe~mit more 
output to be produced with the same inputs. 
Chapter III alluded to the role of technology in the unprecedented 
increase in product per worker in moder n economic growth . Similarly , 
efficient allocation of resources permits more output to be pr oduced 
wit h the same amount of inputs . Accor ding to economic theory, effi-
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cient allocation of resources implies that there is some allocation 
of resources that maximizes national product; and this is when re-
sources are allocated in such a manner that their marginal product is 
2 greatest. And the marginal product of resources is greatest when the 
resources are employed where they earn the greatest returns, and when 
the r eturns are proportional to the marginal product . 
Then, in what sense is government a source of growth? 
Several notions of government as a source of growth were intro-
duced in Chapter I . These include the r ole of government in human 
capital formation and in harmonizing conflicts between private and 
social interests. In addition, Chapter I introduced the assertion 
that government imposes restrictions on efficient utilization of re-
sources, and therefore, removal of these restrictions can stimulate 
economic growth. Attention in this case centers on the government 
deficit and its effect on economic variables such as aggregate output, 
interest r ates and private investment. 
The present chapter, however, attempts to determine the exact 
nature of the impact of government on economic growth. For a star t, 
the effect of the government deficit is distinguished between expendi-
ture and tax changes and their impact on output, interest, private 
investment, etc. Government expenditures , for instance, alter the 
composition of final output . A good example is that of government 
subsidies. Economic theory hold s that subsidies increase the produc-
tion and consumption of subsidized goods . 3 Therefore , changes in 
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government s ubsidy expenditure will a lter the composition of final 
output. 
Given the distinction between expenditure and tax changes, eco-
nomic theory holds that the primary interest is not on the cons equences 
of expenditure and t ax changes per se, but on the effects of these 
h 1 . . 4 c anges on re ative prices . This is because expenditur e and tax 
chan ges al t er r elative prices, which, in turn, induce changes in 
other economic variables such as employment and output. In other 
words, t he link be tween government expenditures and taxes on the 
one hand, and employment and output on the other hand rests on the 
notion that government expenditures and taxes alter the price or cost 
of one good relative to another . The changes in relative prices, in 
turn, induce changes in employment and output. 
Government expenditures alter relative prices in three principal 
5 
ways . First, government expenditures alter relative prices directly; 
through, for instance, a subsidy or voucher system . Such schemes change 
the price of subsidized goods relative to the prices of other goods , 
and this , in turn, changes production and consumption . Second, govern-
ment expenditures change relative prices indirec tly through the regu-
latory system . Commo n examples a r e pollution control devices, minimum 
wage legislation, tariffs and quotas . These affect relative prices 
and involve corresponding restructuring of production and consumption . 
Third, gove rnmen t expenditures affect relat ive prices indirectly 
through tax effects. Government expenditures induce tax changes 
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which, in turn, induce changes in relative pr ices. Thus, according 
to economic theory, when considering t he impac t of government expendi-
tures , the main object of interes t should not be on the nature and 
composition of government expenditure increases , but on t he nature of 
relative price effects induced by the t ax changes necessary to make 
d . . 0 bl 
6 
government expen iture increases poss i e . 
Then , in what ways do t axes alter r e l ative prices? 
Like government expenditur es , t axes alter relat i ve prices in 
h . . 1 7 t r ee pr1nc1pa ways . First, taxes al ter the relative price of 
l abor. The r elative price or opportunity cost of labor is the leisure 
foregone by working . Tax changes affect the choi ce between labor 
and leisure . Economic theor y holds that lower taxes on wages result 
in more income fo r the same wor k , and this induces people to reduce 
their labor sup pl y . This is the income effec t. However, since with 
lower taxes the wage i s higher, the income in addit iona l wages people 
give up by not working mor e i s higher . In other words, with lower 
taxes and high wage r ate , the opportunity cost of leisure is higher 
and this induces peopl e t o increase their l abor supply . This is the 
substitution effec t . The income and s ubs titution effects work in 
oppos ite directions and the r efor e in theor y at least, we cannot deter -
mine the net effect of lower t axes on the incent i ve to work . 
Second, t axes alter the r elative price of saving . The relat i ve 
price or opportunity cost of saving is the additional curr ent consump-
tion fo r egone by saving . Tax changes affect the choice between saving 
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and current consumption . Economic theory holds tha t lower taxes 
i ncr ease household saving by increasing disposable income . However , 
if household saving is de t ermined by both wage income and the r ate 
of return on investment (i.e. , interest income) , then the effec t of 
lower t axes on saving i s indeterminate. This is because lower taxes 
on interest income r educe the pr ice of future consumption in terms 
of foregone curr ent consumption . As a result, two things can happen : 
(1) savings can rise if the demand fo r future consump tion is price 
elastic, or (2) savings can fall if the demand is price inelastic . 
Thus , based on theory alone , we cannot predict the effec t of lower 
taxes on saving as a function of interest income . 
Third , taxes alter the r e lative price of investment. The effect 
of taxes on the incentive to invest i s often analyzed in terms of the 
' flexible capital s t ock adjustment ' model , which i s considered t u 
have first been empl oyed by Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson (1967) 
in their celebr a t ed study of tax policy and investment behavior . 8 
The basic assumption of the model is that a firm maximizes its current 
profits under competi tive condi t ions . Current pr ofi t s a r e defined as 
" . . . gross r evenue less the rental cost of current inputs and less the 
r ental value of capi t a l inputs . 11 9 Taxes enter a firm ' s decision 
through the r en tal value of capital , or what is often called the user 
cost of cap ital. In the absence of taxes , the user cos t of capital 
is given as : 
c = q(r + o ) - q (4 . 1) 
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where c is the user cost of capital, q is the price of capital goods, 
r is the interest rate, o is depreciation, q is the expectations about 
the price of investment goods. 
For a given level of c, a firm's desired level of capital stock 
is determined by the equality of the rental price of capital to the 
marginal product of capital . Hall and Jorgenson used the Cobb-Douglas 
production function to obtain the desired level of capital, K*, as: 
K* 
PQ a. -
c 
(4. 2) 
where P is the price of output, Q is its quantity, c is the rental 
price of capi tal, and a is the elasticity of output with r espec t to 
capital. Each f irm has a desired capital stock at each time . When 
a firm's actual capital stock falls short of the desired capital , the 
firm orders capital goods to eliminate the difference . Thus, in the 
model , gross inves tment is given as a distributed lag function: 
00 
E µ
1
. 6K* + oK 
i=O t-i t 
(4 . 3) 
Gross investment I , in period t, is the sum of a weighted average of 
t 
past changes in desired capital K*, and replacement investment oK . 
t 
Net investment N is then the weighted average of past changes in de-
t 
sired capital stock 
oK 
t 
(4.4) 
45 
Substituting (4 . 3) into (4 . 4), we obtain 
N 
t 
00 
E 
i =O 
ll . DJ.<1< • 
]. t - 1 
Substituting (4 . 2) into (4.5), we obtain 
N 
t 
(4. 5) 
(4.6) 
Equation (4 . 6) indicates that investment in period t depends on the 
capital stock as the beginning of the period and changes in the desired 
level of capital s t ock in previous periods. Desired capital, in turn, 
depends on the value of output, the elasticity of output with respect 
to capital input a, as well as the rental value of capital input c . 
Tax policy enters the investment decisions of the firm through the 
rental value of capital input ct . A change in ct' all else equal, re-
sults in a change in the desired level of capital stock. A change in 
the desired capital stock, in turn, results in net investment or dis-
investment, thereby increasing or decreasing output and productivity. 
Hall and Jorgenson estimated the parameters of equation (4 . 6) 
taking 
c = (1 - k)(l - UZ) q (r + o ) 
1 - u 
where q is the price of capital goods, r is the discount rate, o is 
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the rate of replacement, k is the rate of investment tax credit, U 
the business income tax rate, and Z the pres ent value of the deprecia-
ion deduction on one dollar ' s investment. 
While this formulation by Hall and Jorgenson has provided the 
theoretical basis for substantial research on the incentive to invest, 
however, the wisdom of employing a Cobb- Douglas production function 
in the model has seriously been questioned. 10 It is well - known that 
the elasticity of substitution in the Dobb- Douglas production function 
is equal to one . Thus, for instance, Robert M. Coen and Robert Eisner 
have argued: Since the substitution between capital and labor is an 
important determinant of the demand for capital, it is not reasonable 
b . · 1 . h 1 . . 1 f 11 to ar 1 trar1 y assign t e e ast1c1ty a va ue o one. Coen and 
Eisner have instead suggested the use of a constant- elasticity- of -
substitution (CES) production f unct ion . As a result, equation (4 . 2) 
above becomes 
K* (4 . 2 I ) 
where CL is the elasticity of substitution and the rest of the terms 
are as defined before . Two important observa tions fo llow from equa-
tion (4 . 2 ' ) : (1) if a = 0, relative prices would not appear in the 
equation and since tax policy influences investment through its ef -
fects on c, there would be no inves tment response to changes in tax 
policy . (2) if a = 1, Coen and Eisner argue, the results can hardly 
be regarded as empirical estimates of the effect of tax policy. There -
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fore, Coen and Eisner suggest that a should be estimated rather than 
just assume that a = 1. This brings us to the next section of this 
chapt er, the one that reviews . the evidence of government as a source 
of gr owth . 
The Evidence of Government as a 
Source of Growth 
The theory that links taxes with economic growth derives from 
the notion that lower taxes on wages, interest and corporate income 
increase output and productivity by increasing the incentives to 
work, to save, and to invest. However, whether or not lower taxes 
increase output and productivity is largely an empirical issue . As 
we have just seen in the preceding section of this chap t er, one reason 
the effect of lower taxes is largely an empirical issue is that, in 
the case of the incentives to work and to save, the substitution and 
income effects wor k in opposite directions and therefore the net ef-
fect of lower taxes on labor and saving is indeterminate . On the 
other hand, empirical studies on the effects of tax changes on the 
incentive to work have to contend with the seemingly insurmountable 
problem of measuring the income and substitution effects separately . 
I t is difficult, in practice, to isolate the two effects . In addi-
tion, there is the problem of controlling fo r other factors which 
affect labor supply . Similarly , resear chers on the incentive to save 
have to contend with the problem of unobservable variables when deal-
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h . 1 b h . 
12 
ing wit 1ntertempora e avior . For instance, in the standard 
life-cycle model, savings respond to the expected real after- tax 
rate of return . This is the rate at which households transform 
present into future consumption. The problem in this case is that 
the expected after-tax rate of return is unobservable. Thus, while 
empirical studies indicate that changes in tax r a tes have minimal 
effect on labor supply, the changes have uncertain effect on saving, 
. . 1 . . 13 in particu ar, on interest income. 
Another reason the effect of lower taxes on output and produc-
tiv ity is largely an empirical issue concerns the effect of taxes on 
the incentive to invest. Results of empirical s tudies on the in-
centive to invest seem to be influenced by the underlying assump tions 
of the models of such s tudies . I n particular, the assumptions made 
about the substitution between labor and capital seem to be a significant 
determinant of the outcome. As Robert M. Coen and Robert Eisner have 
a r gued, the assumption concerning the substitution between labor 
and capital is an important determinant of the demand fo r capital . 
Thus, depending on this assumption, different s tudies have yielded 
different results . 
In their study of t ax policy and investment behavior in the U. S . 
during 1931- 41 and 1950-63, Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgen son 
(1967) assumed the elas ticity of substitution to be unity; that is, 
labor and capital are good substitutes . 14 Hall and Jorgenson arrived 
at two main conclusions : (1) tax policy is highly effective in 
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changing the level and timing of investment, and (2) tax policy has 
important effects on the composition of investment. According to 
Hall and Jorgenson, the goodness of fit measure for net investment, 
R2 , was 0 . 92 for manufacturers; 0.96 for manufacturing equipment; 
0.96 for nonfarm, nonmanufacturing equipment; and 0.99 for nonfarm, 
nonmanufacturing structures. Their study also found that the U.S. 
tax reform of 1954 substantially changed the composition of invest-
ment ; from investment in equipment to investment in structures, while 
the investment tax credit and depreciat ion guidelines of 1962 caused 
a shif t toward equipment. 
However, Robert M. Coen and Robert Eisner (1969) employed a CES 
production function and proceeded to estimate and use different values 
of a in the standard capital stock adjustment model. 15 Coen and 
Eisner did not find a statistically significant effect of tax policy 
on investment. On the other hand, Martin Feldstein (1982) used a 
Cobb- Douglas pr oduction assumed by Hall and Jo r genson and found 
2 
(R = 0.98) that investment is highly responsive to changes in tax 
policy .
16 
Feldstein ' s findings not onl y support those of Hall and 
Jorgenson but also the observation that in the capital s tock adjust -
ment model, empirical results are influenced by the value of cr adopted. 
There seems t o be no general agreement on the value of a that should 
be used and this is, perhaps, something that fu ture research will re -
solve . 
Meanwhile, several other tec hniques have been utilized in study-
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ing the link between government and economic growth, but the pre-
dominant one is the cross-section approach. This is the technique 
employed by Richard Rubinson (1977) in his well-known study of de -
17 
veloped and developing countries during 1950 and 1970. 
In essence, Rubinson was addressing the i ssue of economlc de-
pendence and its effect on economic growth. For a start, Rubinson 
adopted the concept of 'economic dependence' as defined by previous 
studies, and measured by such variables as foreign aid; the s tructure 
of trade; foreign inves tment; and external debt. In previous s tudie s , 
economic dependence was fo und to retard economic growth. The purpose 
of Rubinson's study was to t es t a hypothesis suggested by pr evious 
studies: that one way i n which dependence affects economic gr owth i s 
through its effect on state str ength. 
To test the hypo thes is, Rubinson examined t wo r e l at i onships : 
(1) the effect of dependence on state strength, and (2) the effec t of 
state strength on economic gr owth . He defined the degree of s t a t e 
strength as the share of government r evenues in Gr oss Domestic Pr oduc t, 
GDP . His sample of countries in different regr ession equa tions r anged 
from 39 t o 45 , and the sample consis t ed of both developed and develop-
ing countries ; because, he argued, dependence i s a feature of all 
. . h ld 18 coun tries in t e war . 
Rubinson's s tud y gener ated , among o thers , the following r esults : 
(1) government r evenues have positive effec t s on na tiona l income, and 
(2) the positive effects of revenues on national income ar e signifi-
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cantly related to the level of national income; they are much s tronger 
fo r poor e r than for richer countries . He found the regression co-
efficient for government revenues to be as high as 0.08 and significant 
2 
a t the 2% level; and R to be as high as 0 . 95. The regression co-
efficient for government revenues indicates that an increase of 1% 
in the r evenue/GDP r atio increases the rate of economic growth by 
0 . 08%. 
Rubinson also estimated the effect of government revenues on 
national income in poorer countries to be 1.6 times the size of the 
effect in richer countries. Briefly then, according to Rubinson , 
large government stimulates economic growth , especially in poorer 
countries . 
However, in another well-known study, Daniel Landau (1983) ar -
rived a t a different conclusion . 19 Unlike Rubinson, Landau examined 
the relationship between the share of government consumption expendi-
ture in GDP and the rate of growth of real per capita GDP for 96 
developed and developing noncommunist countries. Landau found a 
negative relationship between the share of government consumption 
in GDP and economic gr owth rates for various periods during 1960-76 . 
For instance, he fo und the regression coefficient for government con-
sumption during 1961-76 to be negative (-0 . 19) and significant at the 
2 
1% level, and R to be 0.82 . The coefficient indicates that an in-
crease of 1% in the government consumption/GDP ratio decreases the 
rate of economic growth by 0.19%. Landau, therefore, concluded that 
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"these r esults ar e consis t ent with a pro-free mar ket view that --
within the market economies -- a growt h of government hurts economic 
20 
growth . " 
Jus t as in the case of Rubinson and La ndau, fu rther evidence 
on the r elationship between government size and economic gr owth has 
also tended to be divergent . Rati Ram (1986) , for instance , in his 
s t udy of developed and developing countries during 1960- 80 , found 
evidence to s upport the conc lusion by Rubinson that the impact of 
governmen t size on e.conomic gr owth is positive ; and that the positive 
effect is especi al l y s tronger for low income countries .
21 
Although 
the r egression equations he estimated we re diffe rent f r om those of 
Rubinson a nd Landau , Ram examined the r elationship between government 
con s umption expenditure/GDP ra t io and the r a te of growth of per capita 
income . In addition, Ram util ized both cross-section and time-series 
analysis and observed that there was a broad agreement between the 
results obtained f r om both techniques . The results support Rubinson ' s 
conclusion tha t large gover nment s timulates economic growth, especial l y 
in poorer countries . 
However , in his study of the links between taxes and economic 
gr owth , Keith Mardsen (1983) a rrived at the conclusion that large 
d . h 
22 d d government r e t ar s economic gr owt . Mar sen examine the relation-
ship between tax/GDP r a t ios and economi c gr owth rates of 20 developed 
and developing countries ( inc lud ing Zambia) during 1970- 79 . ~~rdsen 
divided his sample gr oup into 10 pair s of countries with similar 
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per capita incomes but contrasting tax levels. By this criterion, 
for example, he paired Zambia with Thailand with Zambia as the 
higher tax country -- and then proceeded to compare their growth 
rates during the 1970s . 
Mardsen ' s principal finding was that, in all cases, countries 
with lower taxes experienced substantially high real rates of growth 
of GDP than those with higher taxes . For example , during t he 1970s, 
Thailand, a lower tax country, had real average annual growth r a te 
of 8.3%, compared to 1.5% for Zambia, a higher tax country. Mardsen 
found that the average annual rate of growth was 7.3 % in the low-tax 
group and 1.1% in the high-tax group . In addition, he found the 
regression coefficient of the tax variable to be negative ( - 0 . 36) 
and significant at the 1% level: indicating that an increase of 1% 
in the tax/GDP ratio decreases the rate of economic growth by 0 . 36%. 
Clearly, the relationship between government size and economic 
growth is an empirical issue . This c onclusion is again quite apparent 
when one surveys the theory a nd evidence of government as a source 
of economic growth . 
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CHAPTER V. A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT 
SIZE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A common practice in the empirical s tudy of sources of growth 
is to relate growth in national income to changes in l abo r and capi tal 
through a production function. Chapter III showed how this approach 
has been extended to include structural variables such as imports 
and exports, as well as resource allocation between sectors. The pur-
pose of the present chapter is to employ the sources of gr owth approach 
to the study of relation between government size and economic gr owth. 
This is done by following the practice of introducing an externality 
in the production function; the externality here being government 
size . The model in this chapter is adop t ed from the analyses by 
Gershon Feder (1983) and Rati Ram (1986) and is applied to Zambian data 
for the period 1964-84 in order to test the hypothesis that economic 
gr owth varies inversely with government size in Zambia. 1 
A Two-Sector Model of Government 
Size and Economic Growth 
A two-sector model is employed here to characterize the effect 
of government size on economic growth . The basic assumptions of the 
model are : 
1. The economy consists of two sectors ; a government sector , 
(G), and a nongovernment sector (N). The output, i . e ., 
the size of the government sector exercises an externality 
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effect on the output of the nongovernment sector ; and the 
t e rm "externality " is defined in the usual economic sense 
as the case where the a c tions of one economi c agen t affect 
the utilit y or produc tion f unc tion of another agent . 
2 . The economy has avail able two primary fac t ors of pr oducti on : 
Labor (L) and capital (K) . 
3 . The technology of pr oduction in each sector is linearly 
4 . 
homogeneous and given by : 
N N(~, LN' G) 
where, 
N = no ngovernment sector outpu t 
G government sector output 
capital s t ock for the nongovernment and 
goverrunent sector s , respectively 
LN , LG labor force for the nongovernment and 
gove r nment sectors , respectively 
~+KG K total capital stock 
LN+LG L t otal labor for ce 
Total outpu t (Y) is the aggrega t e of the output in the 
sec tors : 
N + G y 
two 
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5. Relative factor productivity in the two sectors differ, 
such that: 
<1 + o) 
where, 
In the absence of externality effec t of government, and for a 
given set of prices, a si tuation in which o = 0 would reflec t on allo-
cation of resources such that t he marginal productivity of factors of 
production is the same in both sec tors; a nd such an alloca tion maxi-
mizes output. However, it is assumed he r e tha t government exercises 
an externality, o i 0, and, therefore, factor productivity differs 
between the two sectors. This assumption is based on the issues 
considered in Chap ter s I and IV . Under the free marke t a r gument, 
for ins tance , o < O; this implies that fac t or productivity in the 
nongovernment sec t or i s greater than in the government sec tor. The 
opposite is equally true . 
The basic equations of the model then are : 
N (5 .1 ) 
59 
G (5 . 2) 
K (5 . 3) 
L (5.4) 
N + G y (5 . 5) 
c1 + o) (5 . 6) 
Since the i nte rest is in changes overtime, equations (5 . 1) - (5 . 5) 
ar e set as functions of time. As in Chapter III , d i fferentiation 
of these equa tions wi th r espect t o time yields : 
N NK ~ +NL LN + NG G (5 . 7) 
G = GK KG + GL LG (5 . 8) 
~ + KG K (5 . 9) 
LN + LG L (5 . 10) 
N + G y (5 .11) 
where dot indicates time derivatives . Rearranging equa t ion (5 . 6) yields : 
(5 . 12) 
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(5 .13) 
Subs tituting equa tion s (5 . 7) - (5 . 10) i nto equa t ion (5 .11) yields : 
(5 . 14) 
Substituting equa tions (S .12) and (5 . 13) in t o (5 .14) , we ob t a i n : 
(5 . 15) 
Def ining t o t a l inves tment I = K = ~ + KG and s inc e L LN + LG f r om 
equa t ion (5 . 10) , subs ti tu t i ng t hese i nto equa t ion (5 .15) , we obtain : 
(5 .16) 
Fr om equat i ons (5 . 8) , (5 .12) and (5 .13) : 
The r efo r e , 
G 
(5 .17) 1 + 0 
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Substituting equation (5 .17 ) into (5 .16) yields : 
y 
( 5 .18) 
By the assumption of linear homogenei t y of the production function: 
s c!) 
L 
(5 .19) 
Defining NK = ~ . substituting for NK and N
1 
in equation (5 .18) and 
dividing through b y Y, we ob tain: 
y 
- = (5 . 20) y 
Equa tion (5 . 20) is a sources-of- gr owth equation with government 
as a sour ce of gr owth, t ogether wi th labor and capital . I t should be 
noted that if marginal fac tor products are equa l across sectors (6 = 0) , 
and if there is no government externality (NG= 0) , then equation 
(5 . 20) r educes t o the familiar neoclassical sources-of-growth equa-
tion stated in Chapter III as equation (3 . 6) : 
where , 
the growth rate of aggregate output 
K I 
= K y 
L 
L 
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the growth rate of capital 
the growth rate of the labor force 
w = Cl. 
K 
the elasticity of out put with respect to capital 
wL = S = the elasticity of output with respect to labor 
In the pr esent case , however, it is assumed t hat o I 0 and NG I 0 . 
On the basis of equation (5 . 20), the fitted equat i on in the pr esent 
s tudy is: 
y (5 . 21) 
where G(G/Y) is the measure of government size .
2 
This method of specifying the effect of government size on economic 
growth is considered a recent innovation and is the approach employed 
by Rati Ram in his study of developed and developing countries. How-
ever, the traditional approach is simply to introduce G as an a r gument 
in the aggregate production function: 
y F(K, L , G) . (5 . 22) 
This is the basic Solow gr owth model minus technical change but with 
G as an additional input . From Chapters III and I V, the result of 
manipulating this equation yields : 
y (S . 23) 
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where G is the measure of government size. This approach is often 
simplified further by introducing the regressor G/Y in place of G in 
equation (5.23) to obtain : 
I G Y = a(-) + SL+ y(-) (5 . 24) y y 
where G/Y is the measure of government size . 3 This is the approach 
employed by Richard Rubinson and Daniel Landau in t heir studies of 
the impact of government size on economic growth . 
However, the new approach has at least two principal advantages 
over the traditional approach . First , the new approach allows for 
intersectoral pr oductivity differential, o, between the government 
and nongovernment sectors. Second , the new approach explicitly models 
the externality effect of government size , NG, and therefore conveys 
better information on the manner in which government size affects 
economic growth . But for the sake of comparison, both equations (5 . 21) 
and (5.24) were fitted in the present study . 
Time Series Analysis of Zambian 
Data: 1964- 84 
In estimating equations (5 . 21) and (5.24), a trend factor , T , 
was added to each equation. By convention , T represents autonomous 
gr owth in Y and is therefore a measure of " ... our ignorance of the true 
forces that determine the growth of the dependent variable . 11 4 Follow-
ing conventional practice , the rate of growth of GDP was used as the 
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proxy for economic growth, and GDP at constant 1980 prices was used 
fo r the aggr egate output measure Y. The rate of population growth, P, 
was used in place of t he rate of increase in labor input , L; investment 
was def i ned as gr oss fixed capi tal formation plus change in stocks; 
and saving was derived as a r esidual : GDP minus consumption . Given 
that there is no consensus on the measurement of government , three 
proxies for gove r nment we r e employed: (1) government final consumption, 
(2) government revenues , and (3) total government expenditures . Annual 
. . . 
rates of gr owth of Y, L , and G, i . e., Y, L, and G were approximated 
by first differences for the logarithms of the var iable values for 
successive years dur ing 1964-84. 
The data fitted to bo t h equations (5.21) and (5 . 24) were obtained 
from various issues of the Monthly Digest of Statistics , published 
by the Republic of Zambia , Central Statistical Office . Supplementary 
data were obtained from various issues of the International Financial 
Statistics , published by the International Monetary Fund . Estimates 
covered the full period 1964-84 and were ob tained by the method of 
o r dinary least squar es (OLS) using the PROC SYSREG procedure of the 
Statistical Analysis System , SAS . 
The results from fitting equations (5 . 21) and (5 . 24) are reported 
in Tables 5.1 , 5 . 2 , and 5 . 3 . The three tables represent , respec tively , 
the thr ee proxies of government; namely , government final consumption, 
government revenues , and total government expenditures. 
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Table 5 .1. Least squares estimates of GDP growth rates (t-ratios 
are in parentheses) 
Eguat ions 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 16 . 9361c 0.215* 16 . 941* 0.200* 53 . 105* 
(1. 53) (3 . 05) (l.48) (2.68) (2 . 37) 
T -0.009* -0 . 009* - 0 . 027ic 
( -1.5 1) (-1.46) ( - 2.36) 
I/Y 0.231 -0. 709* 0 . 231 -0. 463 0 . 563 
(0.33) -1. 96) (0 . 32) (-0 . 77) * (0 . 82) 
i -2.481* -2. 4691< -2 . 483>< -2 . 589 -1. 821 >~ 
(-1.87) (-1.68) ( - 1.74) (-1.82) ( -1. 41) 
G(G/Y)a -0 . 041 0.004 
(-0 . 07) (0 . 01) 
G/Ya - 0.133 0 . 898* 
( - 0 . 51) (1. 82) 
SSE 0 . 070 0.080 0.070 0 . 079 0.058 
R2 0 . 410 0 . 327 0.410 0 . 338 0.517 
s2 0.004 0 .005 0 . 005 0.005 0 . 004 
Degrees of 
16 16 16 freedom 15 16 
aG = government final consumption. 
*Coefficient significant at the .10 level. 
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Table 5. 2 . Leas t squares es timates of GDP gr owth r ates (t-rat ios 
are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
Intercept 
T 
I /Y 
L 
G(G/Y)a 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(1) 
16 . 936>~ 
(1.53) 
-0 . 009* 
(-1.51) 
0.232 
(0 . 33) 
-2 . 481* 
( - 1. 87) 
0 .070 
0 . 410 
0 . 004 
16 
(2) 
0 . 212* 
(3 .19) 
- 0 . 706>~ 
( - 2 . 13) 
- 2 . 602 1< 
(-2.13) 
0 . 426"~* 
(1.09) 
0 .075 
0 . 373 
0 . 005 
16 
aG = government r evenues. 
Equa t ions 
(3) 
22 . 067* 
(2 . 02) 
- 0.0ll 
(-2 . 00) 
0.541 
(0 . 78) 
-2. 634>'< 
(-2 . 09) 
0. 635>'< 
(1. 69) 
0.059 
0 . 505 
0 . 004 
15 
*Coefficient significant at the .10 level. 
**Coefficient significant at the .20 level . 
(4) 
0. 226>'< 
(3 . 36) 
- 0.369 
( - 0.73) 
- 2. 689": 
( - 1.92) 
-0 . 333>'<>'< 
(- 0 . 93) 
0.076 
0.361 
0.005 
16 
(5) 
18 . 567>':1< 
(l.14) 
- 0.009** 
( - 1.13) 
0.250 
(0 . 34) 
-2.438* 
(-1. 74) 
0 . 071 
(0 . 14) 
0 . 070 
0 . 410 
0 . 004 
16 
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Table 5 . 3 . Least squares es t imates of GDP growth rates (t - ratios 
ar e in par en t heses) 
Regr essor s 
Intercept 
T 
I /Y 
L 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(1) 
16 . 936"c 
(1.53) 
- 0. 009"' 
( - 1.51) 
0 . 232 
(0 . 33) 
-2 . 481* 
(-1. 87) 
0 . 070 
0 . 410 
0 . 004 
16 
(2) 
0 . 216"' 
(3 . 18) 
-0 . 762i< 
(-2 .16) 
- 2 . 410* 
( - 1. 70) 
0 . 226 
(0.48) 
0.079 
0.336 
0.005 
16 
Estimators 
(3) 
16 .480 
(1. 40) 
- 0 . 008"c 
( - 1.39) 
0 . 190 
(0 . 25) 
-2 . 450* 
(- 1.77) 
0 . 082 
(0 . 17) 
0.070 
0 . 412 
0.005 
15 
a 
G = total government expenditures . 
*Coefficient significant at the . 10 level . 
**Coefficient significant at the . 20 level . 
(4) 
0 . 208,., 
(3.03) 
-0 . 460 
(-0 . 86) 
- 2 . 597"' 
( - 1.84) 
-0.436** 
(l.16) 
0 .064 
0.459 
0.004 
16 
(5) 
36 . 773* 
(1 . 81) 
-0 . 019* 
( - 1. 80) 
0 . 517 
(0 . 70) 
- 2.133:'c 
( - 1.58) 
0 . 436><>'< 
(1.16) 
0 . 064 
0.459 
0 . 004 
15 
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The statistical significance of the coefficients in each table 
was established by t-tes t s with n - k degrees of freedom, i . e . , by 
testing the hypothesis: 
S. 
i 
0 
HA: negation 
where n is the number of observations , k is the number of r egressors, 
and S. is the coeff i cient of a given regressor . Statistically sig-
1. 
nificant coefficients a r e marked with asterisks in each table . 
In each table, equation (1) depicts the results from fi tting the 
produc tion function without governmen t as a regressor . The coeffi-
cients of equation (1) have plausible s i gns, the t-ratios are large, 
especially fo r the r egr essors T and L. In fact, in all but one equa-
tion, the elasticity of labor is numerically larger than - 2 , implying 
that labor for ce gr owth has a negative and very significant impact on 
economic growth in Zambia. 
The main r eason for the large negative impac t of labor force 
gr owth on economic gr owth seems to be the characteris tic of the Zambian 
populat i on . Construction of a population pyramid and calculation of 
the age - dependency and aged - child ratios for Zamb ia should reveal 
that Zambia has a r elatively "young " population , consisting of a very 
large proportion of children and a very small proportion of the 
5 
elderly . This is a general characteristic of the population of de-
1 . . 
6 0 . 1 ve oping countries . ne important imp ication of a young population 
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is that Zambia devotes a considerable proportion of its resources to 
the maintenance of a high percentage of dependents. It also means 
that the economy cannot generate employment rapidly enough to absorb 
the growth in labor ; hence, the large negative impact of the regressor 
L. 
The coefficient of capital, I/Y, in all cases confirms the im-
portance of capital as a determinant of economic growth. However, the 
estimate of the coefficient seems to be "contaminated" by collinearity 
between capital and the regressor T. This can be seen from comparing 
equations (1) and (2), (1) and (4) in all the t ables . It is clear 
that the omission of T from the r egression reverses the sign of the 
coefficient of capital: suggesting that there is some relationship 
between T and I/Y . It is quite plausible that in an open economy 
such as that of Zambia, productivity of capital largely depends on 
other exogeneous variables represented by the regressor T; such as 
imports and exports . Therefore, omitting these variables from the 
regression changes the impact of capital on economic growth. 
The statistical significance of including the regressor T was 
es tablished by testing the hypothesis: 
HA : negation 
where C is a row of vectors and e is the value of C under H
0
. The 
test statistic was an F-statistic of the form: 
F 
where, 
SSE(w) 
SSE(Q) 
n 
k 
q 
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(SSE(w) - SSE(Q))/q 
SSE(Q)/(n - k) 
SSE of the restricted model 
SSE of the full model 
number of observations of the 
number of parameter estimates 
number of restrictions. 
full model 
of the full model 
The test s tatistic has F(q , n - k) degrees of freedom and these are 
shown in each table. 
In each case , the test statistic showed that T belongs in the 
regression. This can also be seen from the fact t hat in all cases 
when T was included in the regression, R
2 
was relatively larger and the 
coefficients were of t he proper signs. 
In assessing the efficacy of government as a r egressor , the 
starting point was t o test the underlying hypothesis of this study: 
that economic growth varies inversely with gove rnmen t size in Zambia . 
For this, t-tests were constructed as follows: 
H0 : Si < 0 
where S. is the coefficient of government as a regressor in a given 
l 
equation . In all cases , H
0 
was rejected: implying that, statist i cally, 
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economic growth does not vary inversely with government size in Zambia . 
In other words, government growth has a positive impact on economic 
growth in Zambia . 
Is the impact s t atistically significant? One basic conclusion 
arises from looking at the results in the three tables and that is: 
for a given pr oxy of government , the significance of the coefficient 
of government depends on how government size is measured , whether 
as G(G/Y) or simply as G/Y . In Table 5.1 where government is proxied 
by government final consumption, the coefficient is significant when 
government size is measured as G/Y and insignificant when size is 
measured as G(G/Y) . In Table 5 . 2 where government is proxied by 
gover nmen t r evenues, the coefficient is significant when government 
size is measured as G(G/Y) and insignificant when size is measured 
as G/Y. And in Table 5 . 3 where government is proxied by total govern-
ment expenditur es, the coefficient is significant when government 
size is measured as G/Y and insignificant when size is measured as 
G(G/Y). Clearly , the significanc e of the coefficient depends on the 
proxy for government and on how government size is defined. 
It is instructive to compare the results of the present study 
with those of Rati Ram because he not only included Zambia in his 
sample but also estimated the coefficient of government G(G/ Y) for 
Zambia using time ser ies data for the period 1960-80 . Using govern-
ment final consumption as the proxy for government, Ram found the 
coefficient of government for Zambia to be positive (1 . 36) and 
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. .f . 7 signi icant. In the present study, when government is proxied by 
government final consumption and governmen t size is measured as 
G(G/Y), the coefficient is positive (0.004) but insignificant. Thus, 
in both studies, t he coefficient is of the same sign but differs in 
magnitude. What could be the source of the difference in the size 
of the coefficient? 
One reason seems t o be the fact the studies cover different 
periods: 1960-80 in Ram ' s study, 1964-84 in the present study. It 
should be noted that Zambia has only been independent since 1964 (see 
Appendix A) . And it i s possible that a change of government can in-
fluence the relationship between government size and economic growth . 
This could be the case with Ram's study . 
Another reason the size of the coefficients differs between the 
two studies seems to be the difference in the techniques of estimation: 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARiliA) technique in Ram ' s 
study, classical least squares in the present study . In particular, 
Ram employed an AR(l) model, for which the estimates were obtained by 
the AUTOREG procedur e of the Statistical Analysis System , i.e., the 
SAS AUTOREG procedure, while the results of the present study were 
obtained by the SAS SYSREG procedure. 
However, the efficacy of employing an AR(l) model to Zambian 
data is questionable. This is because building an adequate ARil1A model 
requires a large sample size; 50 observations is the conventional 
. . 8 f minimum. There ore, on occasions when a smaller sample is used, 
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such as the 20 observations in Ram's study, there is need t o inter-
pret the results with caution. 
Notwithstanding the difference in the magnitude of the coefficient, 
the two studies indicate that government size has a positive impact on 
economic growth in Zambia . The main reason for the positive impact 
of government growth seems to be the r ole the Government has played 
in providing socio- economic ser vices. A prel iminary analysis of t he 
direction of government expenditures s ince 1964 shows that expenditures 
on socio-economic services are second only t o constitutional a nd 
statutory expenditure in the current budget and predominate in the 
capital budget (see Table 5 . 4) . 
Socio-economic services have been given top priority in Zambia 
partly to make up for the colonial l egacy , and partly due t o the 
Government ' s philosophy of humani sm which, until recently , advoc~ted 
the provision of f ree basic services s uch as educa tion and health . 
It is this type of expenditure which possibly expl a ins t he positive 
impact of government on economic growth in Zamb i a . 
Finally , this study was con c luded by examining the investment 
and savings function fo r Zambia during 1964-84 . This was because of 
supply-side economics which sugges t s tha t the way in which gover nment 
size affects economic gr owth is through its effec t on investmen t and 
. 9 savings . 
Appendix C depicts the investmen t /GDP and the savings/GDP r a tios 
for Zambia during 1964-84 . It is c lear that the s hares of investment 
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Table 5 . 4. The direction of government current expenditures 
Mean share, 1968- 1978 
( %) 
1 . Constitutional and sta tutor y expenditure 33 . 4 
2 . Ministry of Education 15.5 
3. Ministry of lands, na tural resources 
and rur al development 
12 . 1 
4. Ministry of power transport and works 7.3 
5 . Ministry of Health 7.2 
6 . Ministry of Planning and Finance 6.2 
7 . Zambia Police 4 . 3 
aSource: Republic of Zambia, Monthly Diges t of St a tistics , 9(5) 
(May 1973) : 29 - 32 , and 15(12) (December 1979) : 30-31. 
and savin gs have declined since 1973 . During 1964- 74 , investment 
averaged 28.5% of the GDP, but fe ll to 22 . 9% during 1974-84. Similarly, 
savings fell from 41 . 6% during 1964-74 to 20 . 7% of t he GDP during 
1974 - 84 . 
However , as a function of GDP, the savings function pr ovides 
a bet t er fit than the investment f unc tion . This can be seen from the 
r esults of simple r egression for the 1964-84 period : 
I/Y -3 . 019 + 0 . 166(y) 0 . 002) 
S/Y - 5.920 + 0 . 638 (y) 0.056) 
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where y is GDP per capital, S is savings, Y and I are as defined 
before. Clearly, there is a weak link between GDP and the level of 
investment. Thus , even if the issue of government size and economic 
growth were approached from the supply-side view, there would s t ill 
be the issue of the weak link between investment and GDP . It was 
for this reason that the study did not proceed to examine t he relation-
ship between I /Y and ~(G/Y) or G/Y . 
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Notes 
1Gershon Feder, " On Exports and Economic Gr owt h ," Journal of 
Development Economics 12 (February/April 1983) : 59- 73 , and Rati Ram , 
"Government Size and Economic Gr owth: A New Fr amework and Some 
Evidence from Cross- Section and Time Series Data," American Economi c 
Review 76(1) (March 1986) : 191- 203. 
? 
- This equation can also be written as: 
d(ln Y) = a (~) + S[d(ln L)] + (1 ! 0 + NG)[d(ln G)(~)] 
where [d(ln G)](G/Y) is the measure of gove rnment size . 
3Th. . 1 b . is equation can a so e written as : 
d(ln Y) a (~) + S[d(ln L)] + y(~) 
where G/Y is the measure of government size. 
4A K . . Th f E . (L d M · 11 P . outsoyianis, eor y o conometrics on on : acmi an ress 
Ltd., 1977), 280 . 
5By definition, the age-dependency ratio is given as : 
P0- 14 + p65+ 
x 100 
PlS - 64 
wher e P
0
_
14 
= number of people under 15 years of age ; P
65
+ = number 
of people of age 65 and over , and P
15
_
64 
=number of people of age 15 
to 64 . Similarl y , the aged-child ratio i s defined as : 
p65+ 
--- x 100 
P0-14 
where P
0
_14 and P65+ are as defined above . 
6 
On the characteristics a nd effec t s of a "young " populat i on , see 
Michael P . Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (London : 
Longman, 1977), 157-79 . 
7 
Rati Ram , op . cit ., 201 . 
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8see Alan Pankratz, Forecasting with Univariate Box-Jenkins Models 
(New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1983), 11. 
9
see, for instance, Bruce Bartlett and Timothy T. Roth, eds . , 
The Supply-Side Solution (Chatham, N. J . , Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 
1983) . 
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CHAPTER VI. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The role of government in economic growth often generates con-
flicting points of view. One view is that growth in government size 
retards economic growth. This is usually the position of economists 
and others who favo r the free market and seek to restrict the functions 
of government to national defense, maintaining law and order, and main-
taining certain public works which cannot be run profitably by the 
private sector. The principal arguments against increased participa-
tion of government in economic affair s are that: (1) government opera-
tions are often conducted inefficiently because they are not usually 
subject to economic criteria, (2) many government fiscal and mone-
tary policies tend to lower the productivity of the economy, and (3) 
government spending crowds out private investment and consumption. 
Another view is that government size is a catalyst to economic gr owth . 
This is often the position of those who consider government to be 
necessary in removing impediments to economic growth . The principal 
arguments in this case are that: (1) government is crucial in har -
monizing conflicts between private and social interests, (2) govern-
ment can pr otect the domestic economy from the vagaries of the world 
market, and (3) government can secur e an increase in productive in-
vestment and provide a socially optimal level of economic growth . 
The case of Zambia very well illustrates the contrasting views 
on the relationship between government size and economi c growt h. 
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On the one hand, the public sector has grown considerably since 1968 
as a result of the Government ' s attemp t to industrialize the economy 
through the public sector. On the other hand , a sharp and prolonged 
recession since 1973 has prompted the Gove rnment t o institute struc -
tural reforms. As a result, the Government now faces the dilemma of 
maintaining short-term economic stability without having t o retard 
long- term economic growth . 
The purpose of the present s tudy was, therefore, to examine the 
relationship between government size and economic growth in Zambia . 
The underlying hypothesis of the study was that economic growth varies 
inversely wi th government size. In testing this hypothesis, the study 
began by distinguishing between "economic gr owth" and ''economic de-
velopment" and then reviewed the sources of economic growth. 
Economic growth is often defined as a rise in total or per capit a 
GNP , while economic development is considered to be growth plus struc-
tural change . Through the years, the sources of economic growth have 
been char acterized as : gold , trade, agriculture, l abor, capital , 
science and technology. Clearly, there are many sources of economic 
gr owth and t hese vary in importance f r om time to time and from place 
to place . Empirical studies show that structural factor·s such as r e -
allocation of resources between sectors , growth of exports and balance 
of payments are more significant for developing than developed countries, 
whereas the growth of the labor force has more significant effect in 
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developed than developing countries. 
However, although there are many and various sources of economic 
growth, the sources can be divided into two broad categories . First, 
economic growth may be due t o changes in the resources used in produc-
tion, that is, due to changes in fac tor inputs. There are three 
main sources of this kind; namely, land, labor, and capital . Second, 
economic growth may be due t o changes that affec t ou tput per unit of 
input . There ar e again three main sour ces of this kind; namely, 
technology, efficiency , and government . Changes in these sources 
permit more output t o be pr oduced with the same inputs . 
The present study considered the particular case of government 
as a source of economic gr owth. Attention was initially focused on 
the theory and evidence of government as a sour ce of economic growth . 
The study then employed a two-sector growth model to characterize the 
effect of government size on economic growth . This was done by fol -
lowing the practice of introducing an externality in the production 
function; the externality in this case being government size . The 
model was then applied to Zambia data for the period 1964 - 84 in order 
to test the hypothesis that economic growth varies inversely with 
government size in Zambia . 
A basic conclusion that arises from this study is that the ef-
feet of government on economic growth is both a theoretical and 
empirical issue. One reason for this is the inJeterminancy that arises 
from the operation of the income and substitution effects on the in-
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centives to work and to save . Anothe r reason i s the l ack of a general 
agreement on the parametric value of the substitution between capital 
and labor; a value that i s necessar y in determining the effect of tax 
policy on the incentive to invest . Furthermore, the effec t is both a 
theoretical and empirical one because the significa nce of the impact 
of government size depends on the proxy fo r government and how govern-
ment size is measured . 
However, empirical evidence s ugge s t s that government size exer -
c ises a positive effect on economic gr owth in Zambia . The main reason 
for this positive eff ect seems to be the role the Gove rnment has played 
in providing soci o -economic serv ices. 
But t o state that government s i ze exercises a positive effect on 
economic growth in Zambia is not in any way to a r gue against the re-
cent structural reforms in Zambia . On the contrary, the positive im-
pact of gove rnment should be seen as a basis fo r cont inued effort to 
rationalize the scope and operations of the public sect or i n order to 
increase effic iency in the use of resources . 
82 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ahluwalia , Mo t ek S. " Inequality , Poverty and Development . " Journal 
o f Development Economics 3 (1976) : 307- 342 . 
Bartlett, B., and T. P. Rot h , eds. The Supply- Si de Solution . Chatham, 
N. J . : Chatham House Publications, Inc ., 1983 . 
Blaug , Mark . Economic Theor y in Re t r ospect . Cambridge : Cambr idge 
Un iversity Pr ess , 1985 . 
Boadway , Robin W. , and David E. l.Jildasin. Public Sec to r Economics . 
Bos t on : Li t tle , Brown and Company , 1984. 
Brennan , Geoffrey and Jonat han Pincus . "The Growth of Gove rnment : 
Do The Figures Tell Us What We Want t o Know? " In Why Gove r nments 
Gr ow: Measuring Public Sector Size, ed . Char les Taylor. Bever ly 
Hills : Sage Publications , 1983 . 
Chene r y , Hollis , et al . Industrial ization and Gr owt h : A Comparative 
Study . London : Oxford Univer si t y Press , 1986 . 
Chener y, Hol l is , e t a l . A Uniform Analys i s of Development Patterns . 
Har vard University Cen ter fo r International Affa irs . Economic 
Development Report 148 (June 1970) Cambridge , Massachuset t s . 
Coen , Robert M. " Tax Policy and Investment Behavior : Comment . " 
American Economi c Review 59 (3) (1969) : 370- 79 . 
Coll ier ' s Encyclopedia . 1983 ed . S .v . "Gove rnment ." 
Denison , Edward F . Why Gr owth Rates Differ . Washington, D. C.: The 
Brookings I ns titution , 1967 . 
De u tch , Karl W. " The Public Sector : Some Concepts and Implications ." 
In Why Governments Gr ow : Measuring Public Sector Si ze , ed . 
Charles Lewis Taylor . Beverly Hills: Sage Publications , 1983 . 
Editor ' s introduc t ion . "Af rican Crisis Continues : The Case of Zambia . " 
Hunger Notes 14(4) (Januar y 1989) : 16-17 . 
Eisner , Robert. "Tax Po l icy a nd Investment Behavior : Comment ." 
American Economic Review 59(3) (1969) : 380-89 . 
Ell i ot , Charles . Con s traints on the Economic Development of Zambia . 
London : Oxfo rd Unive r s ity Press, 1968 . 
83 
Feder, Ger shon . " On Exports and Economic Growth. " Journal of 
Developmen t Economics 12 (Februar y/April 1983) : 59 - 73 . 
Felds t ein , Mart i n . " Infla t ion , Tax Rules and Investment: Some 
Econometr ic Evidence ." Econometr ica 50(4) (July 1982) : 825-65 . 
Flammang , Rober t A. " Economic Gr owth and Economic Development: 
Counter parts or Competi t ors?" Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 28(1) (1979) : 47- 61. 
Foley , D. K. " State Expenditure From a Mar xist Perspective . " Journal 
of Public Economics 9 (1978): 221- 238. 
Gor don , Robert J . Macroeconomi cs. Boston : Little , Brown and Company, 
1978 . 
Gartz , E., and J . D. Hansen . "The Relative Size of t he Public 
Sector and t he Burden in Neoclassi cal Model. " Scandinav ian 
Journal of Economics 78 (1976): 413- 26 . 
Gup t a , S . P . "Public Expenditure and Economic Growth : A Ti me Series 
Analysis . " Public Finance 22 (1976 ): 423 - 61. 
Hagen , Ever ett , E. , and Oli Hawrylyshyn . "An Analys is of World Income 
Gr owth, 1955- 1965. " Economic Development and Cultur al Change 
18 (October 1969) : 1-96. 
Hall , Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson . "Tax Policy and I nvestment 
Behavior. " American Economic Review 57(3) (June 1967) : 391- 414 . 
Henderson , James M. , and Richard E. Quandt . Micreconomic Theor y : 
A Mathematical Approach . New York : McG r aw-Hil l Book Co ., 1980 . 
Hicks , Norman, and Paul Str ee ten . " Indicators of Development : The 
Search for a Basic Needs Yardsti ck . " World Development 7 (1979) : 
567 - 80. 
Humphries, Jane . " Causes of Economic Growth . " Economi c Development 
and Cultural Change 24(2) (January 1976) : 339- 53 . 
Inte rnat ional Encyc l opedia of the Soci al Sci e nces . 1968 ed . S.v. 
"Economic Gr owth . " 
International Labour Organization. Narrowing the Gaps , Planning fo r 
Basic Needs and Pr oductive Employment in Zambia . Geneva , Switzer-
land : International Labor Offi ce , 1977 . 
84 
International Monetar y Fund . International Financial Statistics . 
Washing ton, D. C.: Int e rna tional Monetary Fund, 1986 . 
J us t, Richard E., et al. Applied Welfare Economics and Publ i c Policy . 
Englewood Cliffs , N. J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc ., 1982 . 
Kindleberger , Charles P . Economic Devel opmen t . New York: McG r aw- Hill 
Book Co. , 1965 . 
Koutsoyianis, A. Theor y of Econome trics . London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd. , 1977. 
Kuznets , Simon. ''Modern Economic Gr owth : Findings and Reflections . " 
American Economic Review 63(3) (June 1973): 247 - 59 . 
Landau , Daniel. "Gover nment Expenditur e and Economic Gr owth : A 
Cr oss- Country Study ." Sou thern Economic Jou rnal 49 (January 1983) : 
783- 92 . 
Levin, J . "On Measuring Government." Finance and Development 9(3) 
(September 1972) : 14 - 20 . 
Lewis , W. Arthur. "The Stat e of Developmen t Theor y ." American 
Economic Review 74(1) (March 1984) : 1-10 . 
Mardsen, Keith. "Links Between Taxes and Economic Gr owth : Some 
Empirical Evidence. " World Bank Staff Working Paper s (605) 
(August 1985) : 1-34 . 
Meier , Gerald M. Leading Issues in Economic Developmen t . London: 
Oxford Univer sity Press, 1984 . 
Mel t zer, A. H., and S. F . Richa rd . "A Rational Theor y of the Size 
of Government ." Journal of Political Economy (89) (1981): 
914- 27 . 
Mills , Edwin S . The Burden of Government . Stanford, California : 
Hoover Institution Press, 1986 . 
National Commiss i on for Developmen t Planning . New Recovery Progr amme : 
Interim National Development Plan , July 1987 - December 1988 . 
Lusaka : Government Printe r s , 1987 . 
Pankra tz, Alan. Fore casting with Univariate Box-Jenkins Models . New 
York : John Wi ley & Sons, 1983 . 
Peltzman , S . "The Growth of Government . " Journal of Law a nd Economics 
23 (2) (1980): 209- 87 . 
85 
Protopapadakis, Aris. "Supply-Side Economics : What Chance for Suc-
cess?" In The Supply-Side Solution, eds . Bruce Bartlett and 
Timothy T. Roth. Chatham, N. J .: Chatham House Publications, 
Inc., 1983. 
Republic of Zambia . Monthly Digest of Statistics 9(5) (May 1973) : 
29- 32 . And 15(12) (December 1979): 30-31 . 
Republic of Zambia. Monthly Digest of Statistics 22(5) (August 1986) : 
1-52. 
Ram, Rati. "Government Size and Economic Gr owth: A New Framework 
and Some Evidence From Cross-Section and Time- Series Data." 
American Economic Review 76(1) (March 1986): 191- 203 . 
Robinson, Sherman. " Sources of Gr owth in Less Developed Countries : 
A Cross-Section Study . " Quarterly Journal of Economics 85 (3) 
(August 1971): 391 - 408. 
Rose, R. "What I f Anything Is Wr ong With Big Gove rnment ?" Journal 
of Public Policy 1 (1) (1981) : 5- 36. 
Rubinson, Richard. " Dependence, Government Revenue and Economic 
Growth , 1955- 70 . " Studies in Compar ative International Develop-
ment 12 (Summer 1977) : 3-28 . 
Schroeder, Gertrude E., and John S . Pitzer. "The USSR and Eastern 
Europe, 1. " In Why Governments Grow : Measuring Public Sector 
Size, ed . Charles Lewis Taylor. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
1983 . 
Seers, Dudley . "The Limitations of the Special Case . " Bulletin of 
the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics 25 
(May 1963): 77 - 98. 
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations. Vol . 1. London: Oxford Univers i ty Press, 1976 . 
Solow , Robert H. 
Function ." 
312 - 20 . 
"Technical Change and the Aggr egate Production 
Review of Economics and Statistics 39 (August 1957): 
The New Encyclopedia Britanica. 1984 ed . S. v. "Economic Growth. " 
Thirlwall, A. P. "A Plain Man ' s Guide to Kaldor's Growth Laws ." 
Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 5(3) (Spring 1983): 345 - 58 . 
86 
Todaro, Michael P . Economic Development in the Third World . London: 
Longman, 1977. 
Tordoff, William. Politics and Administration in Zambia. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1974. 
United Nations . A System of National Accounts. New York: United 
Nations, 1968 . 
United Nations. " Zambian Child Mortality and the Economic Crisis . " 
Hunger Notes 14(4) (January 1989): 18-19. 
United Nations. "Zambian Logjam with the World Bank and IMF." 
Hunger Notes 14(4) (January 1989): 20-21. 
87 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am great l y indeb ted to the University of Zambia fo r the fellow-
ship which enabled me to pursue graduate work . 
. .. And t o Professor Lehman Fle t cher for his counse l and guidance 
during my gr aduate wor k at I owa State University . 
I wish t o express my s incer e appreciation to Pr ofessor Hylke Van de 
Wa t ering and t o Dr. Steven G. Keven , fo r their f riendshi p , suggestions 
and as membe r s of my gr aduate committee . 
... And t o fellow gradua t e student s , David Giles McDona l d and 
Rashid H. Hassan, for their comments and sugges tions during the course 
of writing this thesis . 
To Maggie Wheelock for her meticulous effort and concern in typing 
this thesis . 
I dedicate this thesis to my mother , Nelia Mwandu ; to my brothers, 
Leonard a nd Josephat Mupirnpila ; and to my siste r s, Chr istina Mbundi 
and France s Mupimpila, fo r t heir love and patience with my endeavors . 
88 
APPENDIX A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ZAMBIA 
Zambia was born out of a vast mining complex, primarily that 
of copper . Even though David Livingstone and other nineteenth century 
Eur opean explorers realized the po t ential of the region, it was John 
Cecil Rhodes, however, who through the British South Africa Company, 
brought it under British influence. In 1891 , the Company divided the 
region into two administrative units: North-Western and North- Eastern 
Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia was created in 1911 when the two terri-
tories were amalgamated. In 1924, it became a British Protectorate 
when the Imperial Government took over the administration from the 
Company . Together with Southern Rhodesia and Nyansaland, on August 31 , 
1953, Northern Rhodesia formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyansa-
land -- also known as the Central Africa Federation . This was dis -
solved on December 31, 1963 . And on October 24 , 1964, the British 
Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia became an independent republic under 
the name of Zambia . 
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APPENDIX B. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS OF 
THE ZAM BIAN ECONOMY: REAL GDP, GD P GROWTH RATES , 
INVESTMENT AND POPULATION1 
Real GDP 
GDP growth Investment Population 
Year (millions of K) r a tes (mill ions of K) (millions) 
1964 1618 57 . 2 3 . 60 
1965 1915 0 .16853 155.9 3 . 70 
1966 2172 0.12593 226 . 2 3.83 
1967 2449 0 . 12003 274 . 2 3 . 95 
1968 2632 0 . 07206 320 . 7 4 . 05 
1969 3123 0 .17105 238 . 0 4 . 06 
1970 2695 - 0.14740 338 . 0 4 . 18 
1971 2697 0 . 00074 416.0 4 .30 
1972 2962 0 .09372 421.0 4 . 42 
1973 2934 - 0.00950 459 . 0 4 . 68 
1974 3132 0 . 06531 692 . 0 4 . 83 
1975 3056 -0 . 02456 642 . 0 4 . 98 
1976 3187 0.04197 452 . 0 5 . 14 
1977 3035 - 0 . 04887 490 . 0 5 . 30 
1978 3067 0 . 01049 537.0 5 . 47 
1979 2975 - 0.03046 576 .0 5 . 65 
1980 3064 0 . 02948 701.0 5.83 
1981 3253 0 . 05986 673 . 0 5 . 83 
1982 3161 -0.02869 603 . 0 6 . 03 
1983 3099 -0.01981 575 . 0 6.24 
1984 3058 -0 . 01332 724 . 0 6 . 44 
1 
Source: Republic of Zambia , Monthly Digest of Statistics, 
22(5) (August 1986) : 1-52 . International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics , Yearbook , 1986 . 
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APPENDIX C. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS OF 
THE ZAMBIAN ECONOHY: REAL GDP, REAL PER CAPITA GDP , 
INVESTMENT/GDP AND SAVINGS/GDP RATIOS 
Real Real GDP 
Year GDP per capita Investment 
(millions of kwacha) % 
1964 1 , 618 
1965 1, 915 
1966 2,172 
1967 2 , 449 
1968 2 , 632 
1969 3 ,123 
1970 2 , 695 
1971 2 , 697 
1972 2,962 
1973 2,934 
1974 3 ,132 
1975 3 ' 056 
1976 3,187 
1977 3 , 035 
1978 3 , 067 
1979 2 , 973 
1980 3,064 
1981 3' 253 
1982 3J161 
1983 3 , 099 
1984 3,058 
1964-74 2 ,575 
1974- 84 3,099 
449 
518 
572 
628 
650 
758 
634 
614 
654 
627 
648 
614 
620 
573 
561 
526 
526 
558 
524 
497 
474 
614 
557 
11.4 
24 . 5 
28 . 9 
30 . 8 
32 . 4 
18.1 
28 . 4 
37.3 
35 . 3 
29 . 2 
36 . 6 
40 .6 
24 .1 
25 .1 
23 .9 
14.1 
23 . 3 
19.3 
16.9 
13 . 8 
14 . 7 
28.5 
22 . 9 
Share in CDP of 
Savings 
% 
38 . 4 
39 . 9 
43 . 0 
36.9 
39 . 3 
51. 4 
45 . 4 
35 .1 
36 . 9 
45 . 0 
46.0 
21. 0 
29.3 
22 .5 
20 . 5 
23 .1 
19 . 3 
6.8 
8 . 0 
12.6 
18.5 
41. 6 
20.7 
Imports 
% 
42 . 6 
37 . 0 
39.5 
43 . 5 
44.3 
32.4 
37 .1 
44 .5 
41. 9 
33 . 2 
40.5 
55 . 8 
39 . 3 
42 . 7 
36 . 9 
36.5 
45 . 4 
41.1 
36 . 5 
31. 8 
32 . 8 
39 . 7 
39 .9 
Exporc:s 
% 
82 . 0 
56 . 0 
57 . 7 
52 . 4 
54 . 0 
68.2 
55.5 
44 .1 
46 .0 
46 . 4 
47 . 8 
34.5 
42 .6 
38 . 7 
32 . 8 
44 .0 
39.6 
27 . 7 
27.3 
30.6 
36 .6 
55 . 5 
36 . 6 
1 
Sources: Republic of Zambia , Monthly Digest of Statistics, 
22(5) (August 1986): 1-52 . International Mone t a r y Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1986. 
